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INTRODUCTION
When he was just fourteen years old, Addolfo Davis was convicted as an
accomplice of two counts of murder, attempted murder, and home invasion. Based on his
offense, Illinois law mandated a natural life sentence without consideration of any
mitigating circumstances. Last year, however, the United States Supreme Court held that
a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a youth like Davis constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment and thus violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Miller v.

Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Consequently, the First District Appellate Court
granted Davis a new sentencing hearing, holding that Miller should apply retroactively to
his case on post-conviction review under the retroactivity analysis established by Teague

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and adopted by this Court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d
218 (1990). Davis now comes before this Court on the State's petition to consider
whether Davis is entitled to a new sentencing hearing under Miller.
The focus of this amicus brief is narrow. It recognizes that the Appellate Court
below correctly applied Teague to find Miller retroactive to petitioners like Davis on
post-conviction review. Still, should this Court disagree that Miller applies retroactively
under Teague, amici 1 contend that this Court need not be bound by Teague-because this
Court's powers to grant collateral relief in state proceedings are broader. And Miller is
precisely the kind of landmark case for which this Court should exercise its broad power

Amici consist of the following law professors, who represent a diverse body of
clinical and academic scholarship in Illinois law schools: Professors Timothy P. O'Neill,
John Marshall School of Law; William K. Carroll, John Marshall Law School; Herschella
G. Conyers, University of Chicago Law School; Daniel T. Coyne, liT Chicago-Kent
College of Law; Marc D. Falkoff, Northern Illinois University College of Law; Jane E.
Raley, Northwestern University School of Law; Alan Raphael, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law; and Ronald C. Smith, John Marshall Law School.

to grant post-conviction relief to defendants like Davis. Accordingly, amici urge this
Court to affirm the Appellate Court's decision vacating Davis's sentence and ordering a
new sentencing hearing under Miller.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND TO APPLY TEAGUE TO PROVIDE
RETROACTIVE RELIEF IN STATE COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS.
Neither Teague nor this Court's adoption of Teague in Flowers should constrain
Illinois courts in providing post-conviction relief. In reviewing a federal habeas corpus
petition from a state prisoner, Teague held that principles of federalism-specifically,
comity and deference to state court judgments-trump the individual justice concerns of
a convicted state prisoner. These federalism concerns, however, do not apply to a state
court evaluating the validity of its own criminal judgments.
Decided twenty-three years ago, Flowers adopted Teague too rigidly. First,

Teague was concerned with the proper balance between the federal court system and the
state court system; its focus was not on delivering ultimate justice solely within a state

court system itself Ifunclear at the time Teague was decided in 1989, a decision five
years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008),
makes explicit what was implicit in Teague: that because comity was Teague's overriding
concern, it only has relevance to the issue of how much deference federal courts should
extend to state court judgments. Indeed, the Court in Danforth held that "considerations
of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class
of individuals than is required by Teague." I d. at 279-80 (emphasis added). Notably, this
Court decided Flowers in 1990 without the benefit of Danforth.
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Second, application of Teague within the state court system is self-defeating-the
very point of Teague is to honor the final judgments of state courts, and yet Teague
restrains state courts' power to correct clear constitutional violations. Finally, the most
conceivable reason supporting the Flowers "non-retroactivity" rule is the value of finality
in criminal cases. Closer analysis, though, shows that finality is not a strong enough
reason to let constitutional violations suffered by post-conviction defendants stand. In
short, Teague is at most a floor, but certainly no ceiling for retroactive relief in Illinois.

A.

TEAGUE WAS EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED WITH FEDERAL

HABEAS REVIEW OF FINAL STATE JUDGMENTS.
Teague was a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that limited federal
habeas review of state criminal cases. The petitioner there had exhausted direct review of
his conviction-which was "final" for purposes of federal habeas review. See Teague,
489 U.S. at 292-94, 311. Only after the petitioner's conviction became final did the U.S.
Supreme Court decide Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), finding that racial
discrimination by the state in exercising peremptory challenges in jury selection violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Teague filed a petition for federal habeas corpus; the
Seventh Circuit, sitting en bane after Batson was decided, held that Teague could not
benefit retroactively from the Batson rule. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 294.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion2 in Teague re-configured the role of federal
habeas corpus in reviewing state convictions. Justice O'Connor observed that federal

Although Teague was a plurality opinion garnering only four votes, the rule was quickly
applied by a majority ofthe Court. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,313 (1989)
("Because Penry is before us on collateral review, we must determine, as a threshold
matter, whether granting him the reliefhe seeks would create a 'new rule.' Under
Teague, new rules will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless
they fall into one of two exceptions." (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2
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habeas review should not function to reverse a final judgment of a state court merely
because recent changes in the law could dictate a different result. See id. at 306-10. Nor
should it be used as a vehicle to announce new constitutional rules. Id. at 316. Rather, the
sole function of federal habeas review is to correct seriously flawed state court
decisions-where a state court had improperly flouted constitutional principles that
existed at the time the state court decided the case? See Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal

Procedure 1372 (5th ed. 2009). The rationale for this limited review is that "interests of
comity and finality must ... be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas
review." Teague, 489 U.S. at 308. Thus, the non-retroactivity principle announced in

Teague is only germane to the work of federal courts, i.e., it establishes the degree of
deference that federal courts must give state court criminal judgments. Exclusively based
on federalism and comity principles, Teague has little relevance to how a state court
system should govern itself.
In Flowers, in contrast, this Court was faced with the question of whether an

Illinois prisoner could seek relief in an Illinois post-conviction proceeding by relying on a
case decided after his conviction became final. Flowers filed a petition under Illinois's
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (now codified at 725 ILCS 5/122), arguing for relief under

People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184 (1988), which reversed a murder conviction based on
seriously flawed jury instructions. See Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 224, 234-36. This Court
held that Flowers could not obtain post-conviction relief because Reddick, decided after

Teague recognized two exceptions where "new rules" would be given retroactive effect
on federal habeas review. One is for a new rule which "places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of criminal law-making authority."' Teague,
489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). The second is for a new rule that concerns "watershed rules" of criminal
procedure. !d. at 311.
3
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Flowers's conviction had become final, constituted a new rule. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at
239-40. Relying on Teague, this Court reasoned that if new rules of constitutional law do
not apply retroactively to state prisoners on federal habeas corpus review, the same rule
should apply to state prisoners on state post-conviction review. Id. at 238-42.
At first blush, the analogy seems plausible. But closer analysis shows its fatal
flaws. In fact, this Court in Flowers spent only a few paragraphs deciding the issue. I d. at
237-39. Though defendants in both cases sought retroactive application of favorable case
law decided after their state convictions became final, Flowers concerned review within a
single court system, whereas Teague addressed the relations between federal courts and
state courts. Thus, Teague's underlying values of federalism and comity are irrelevant to
Illinois courts deciding Illinois cases. Indeed, Flowers adopted Teague without discussing
how Teague's underlying values of federalism and comity are relevant to Illinois courts
deciding Illinois cases.
And the reason for the absence of such a discussion is this: principles of
federalism presume that both the state and federal court systems are each doing their jobs
properly. The Supreme Court in Teague saw state courts as fully capable of doing justice
in their own criminal law systems. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. Thus, it saw the liberal
use of federal habeas corpus as an insult to state courts' abilities to administer criminal
justice. See, e.g., Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal
and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22

WM.

& MARY L. REV.

801, 812-14 ( 1981) (arguing against a perceived lack of respect for the ability of state
court judges to apply federal constitutional law). Comity demanded that federal courts
treat state court criminal judgments with due deference, with the presumption being that

5

state courts had already "gotten it right" and that federal courts should interfere only in
egregious cases. But the deference to state courts embodied in Teague is predicated on
the philosophy that federal review should presume that a state court reached a fair and
just decision.
Ultimately, Teague functions as a barrier between federal and state courts,
denying federal courts the power to interfere with state court convictions that have
presumptively been thoroughly vetted within the state court system. Based on the
principles of comity inherent in our federal system, Teague is willing to assume that the
state court has done its best to come to a correct result. When considering relief within
their own systems, however, state courts are not bound by Teague. See Timothy P.
O'Neill, New Law, Old Cases, Fair Outcomes: Why The Illinois Supreme Court Must

Overrule People v. Flowers, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 727 (2012) (arguing that Flowers was
wrongly decided because Teague's concerns of comity and federalism do not apply
within state court systems).

B.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE POLICIES
BEHIND TEAGUE PERMIT BROADER HABEAS RELIEF BY STATE
COURTS.
The Court in Flowers adopted Teague without the clarity provided by the U.S.

Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), decided eighteen years
later in 2008. The issue in Danforth was whether Teague's retroactivity analysis binds
state as well as federal courts. In holding that Teague does not limit state courts' ability to
grant broader retroactive relief in state post-conviction cases, Danforth reveals the flaws
in this Court's decision in Flowers.
Appealing the dismissal of his state post-conviction petition, Danforth made two
arguments. First, he argued that under Teague he was entitled to retroactive application of
6

Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which tightened the rules concerning the
use of out-of-court statements under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
Alternatively, Danforth argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court was "'free to apply a
broader retroactivity standard than that of Teague,' and should apply the Crawford rule to
[his] case even if federal law did not require it to do so." Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267-68
(citation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that it had no choice in the matter,
and was legally bound to apply Teague whenever the retroactivity of a new federal rule
was at issue. I d. at 268 & n.2. Under a Teague analysis, it found that Crawford was not
retroactive. Id. at 267-68. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, made clear that Minnesota
was free to reject the Teague analysis within its own state court system and apply a
broader standard of retroactivity. Id. at 282. Notably, this Court in Flowers recognized it
was not legally bound to apply Teague to its state post-conviction law. See Flowers, 138
Ill. 2d at 237-38 (recognizing it was not compelled to adopt Teague in Illinois).
In explaining why a state was not constitutionally forced to follow Teague, the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Danforth, however, not only held that state courts are
not required to apply Teague, it shows why a state court's application of Teague would
be unwise. As discussed above, Danforth emphasized that Teague was a narrow decision
only relevant to relations between federal courts and state courts: "[Teague] was tailored
to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States
could provide broader relief in their own post-conviction proceedings." Danforth, 552
U.S. at 277. Teague, in fact, said nothing about limitations on states; it was simply
interpreting a federal statute. See id. at 278-79 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243).
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Particularly relevant here, Danforth explained that Teague "was meant to apply
only to federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state court criminal
convictions." ld. at 279. Teague is not germane to how a state court should deal with
retroactivity within its own state system. The decision itself stressed that its holding was
based on concerns of federalism and comity, and, as Danforth noted, these concerns "are
unique to federal habeas review of state convictions." !d. Importantly, Danforth
observed:

If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state
courts to grant [post-conviction] relief to a broader class of individuals
than is required by Teague . ... It is a matter that States should be free to
evaluate ....

!d. at 279-80 (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that "[s]tates are independent
sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws." Jd. at 280. Thus,
the Court in Teague had no intention of limiting "a state court's authority to grant relief
for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State's
convictions." Jd. at 280-81.
While Danforth reasserts that the main considerations behind Teague were
federalism and comity, the word "federalism" is nowhere to be found in the few
paragraphs that analyze Teague in Flowers. Cf Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 237-40. And
although Flowers acknowledges that "comity" issues underlie Teague, see id. at 239, it
offers no analysis of why this principle ofjederalism should impact whether Illinois
should apply Teague to its own state post-conviction proceedings.
C.

ADOPTION OF TEAGUE FOR STATE POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS DEFEATS THE INTENT OF TEAGUE ITSELF.
Not only is this Court not bound by Teague, there are compelling reasons why it

should not apply Teague to settle retroactivity on state collateral review. When a state
8

court system applies Teague to its own decisions, it limits its own power to reach optimal
results. The use of Teague denies a post-conviction petitioner the benefit of a favorable
rule already given to another person within the state itself When the federal system
applies Teague, it restrains federal courts from interfering with a state's efforts to reach
the best possible result in a case using the law in place at that time. But when a state
applies Teague to its own cases, it only restrains itself from reaching the best result.
Indeed, it undermines the very point of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which is to
empower state courts to correct constitutional violations that could not be remedied on
direct review.
Thus, a state's adoption of Teague destroys the whole reason why federal courts
apply Teague: to defer to state court judgments in the first place. A supreme court justice
in Louisiana captured this point perfectly when he noted that a state court's adoption of

Teague "does not promote the goals of federalism; instead, in self-defeating circularity,
[the state court] blindly replicates the very federal habeas rule by which the High Court
attempts to accord comity to our state laws and decisions." State ex ref. Taylor v. Whitley,
606 So. 2d 1292, 1303 (La. 1992) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Similarly, Flowers misunderstood the framework in which Teague's solution
should apply. The retroactivity solution offered by Teague is geared to problems between
sovereigns, i.e., federal habeas review of state judgments. But the Flowers situation
concerns retroactivity within a sovereign's own system. Whereas federal courts may
sacrifice the optimal result to promote comity between state and federal courts, no such
comity issue in dealings within a sovereign justify letting constitutional violations persist.
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Like Teague, Flowers was willing to sacrifice optimal results; unlike Teague, however, it
made that sacrifice for a less compelling purpose.

D.

FINALITY IS NOT A STRONG ENOUGH REASON TO DENY
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF FAVORABLE CHANGES IN THE
LAW ON STATE COLLATERAL REVIEW.
Flowers cited two reasons for denying retroactive application of favorable

changes in the law to state prisoners on post-conviction review: comity and finality. See

Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 239. As previously demonstrated, federal-state comity has no
relevance to issues within an individual state court system. It is true, however, as Chief
Justice John Roberts noted in his dissenting opinion in Dariforth, that "finality" was a
value mentioned in Teague. See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 300 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Yet
finality concerns in state post-conviction proceedings are less significant than those in
federal habeas review and do not justify the application of Teague in state postconviction cases. Where constitutional jurisprudence has not evolved sufficiently until
after a conviction has become final, Illinois courts through the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act are authorized to protect interests of justice that prevail over finality concerns.
In important ways, a federal habeas corpus case is procedurally distinct from an

Illinois post-conviction case. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a state prisoner must
show that he has "exhausted" his claim, that is, that he has given the state court system an
adequate opportunity to rule on his claim by taking advantage of every state forum. See

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982). Moreover, if the claim was never properly
raised under state court rules, the claim is considered "procedurally defaulted" and barred
from being raised in a habeas corpus petition. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 8687 (1977).
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Illinois post-conviction petition procedure is the mirror-image of this. Any issue
previously decided on state direct review will be denied post-conviction consideration on
the grounds of res judicata; conversely, any issue that could have been raised on direct
appeal, but was not, is considered procedurally defaulted. See People v. Ligon, 239 Ill. 2d
94, 103 (20 10). Thus, the only issues cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
are those constitutional issues that could not have been raised on direct review because
the issues relied on material beyond the trial record. By definition, then, state prisoners
must raise issues in every possible state forum in order to preserve them for federal
review. It is one thing for a federal court to deny retroactivity of a new rule to an issue on
which the petitioner had already obtained several reviews in state court. But it is very
different to deny retroactivity to a prisoner who was compelled by state procedure to raise
an issue for the first time on post-conviction review. Ordinary retroactivity rules allow a
defendant to take advantage of new rules throughout the course of his direct appeal. See

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,328 (1987). To compel a prisoner to raise an issue for
the first time in a post-conviction context-and then to deny him the retroactivity he
would have received on direct appeal-is both arbitrary and unjust. "Just as finality is
not a strong enough interest to overcome the need for retroactive application of new rules
on direct review, so too to the extent state post-conviction proceedings serve as a first
round of litigation for certain types of claims, finality must fail as a justification for
nonretroactivity." Christopher N. Lasch, The Future ofTeague Retroactivity, or

"Redressability, "After Danforth v. Minnesota, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 61 (2009)
(footnote omitted).

11

In fashioning a rule to replace Flowers, this Court might consider a retroactivity
test once used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),

overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), and overruled by Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989). This flexible test weighs several factors: 1) the purpose of the new
rule; 2) prior reliance on the "old" rule; and 3) the administrative burden of retroactivity.

See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636-38. Several states have replaced reliance on Teague with
the Linkletter test. See, e.g., State v. Jess, 117 Haw. 3 81, 402 n.20 (2008); see also State

ex ref. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 661 & n.5 (Mo. 2011 ). Unsurprisingly,
application of Linkletter here bears out the result requested by Davis. The purpose of

Miller is to remedy unconstitutional punishment, and to provide an unconstitutionally
denied guarantee that both age and individuality be considered in sentencingparticularly when that sentence condemns a child to prison until death. Prior reliance on
the authority to automatically impose life-without-parole sentences on children has been
limited to an estimated 105 cases prior to Miller. See People v. Williams, 982 N.E. 2d
181, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Administratively then, allowing retroactive application of
Miller does not unduly burden the judicial system.
But whatever rule this Court decides to use in lieu of Teague, it must recognize
the compelling reasons Davis-who is serving a natural life sentence for an act
committed when he was fourteen years old-deserves a new sentencing hearing pursuant
to the rule of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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CONCLUSION

Teague is a U.S. Supreme Court case concerned with comity and federalism,
rather than the inner workings of a state court system at issue here. For all of the reasons
discussed above, this Court should not be constrained by Teague in granting collateral
relief to Davis under Miller. Accordingly, amici urge this Court to affirm the Appellate
Court's decision granting Davis a new sentencing hearing.
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